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(XAAZ-17958

10 Dec 63

Summary of Osnald Case Prepared for
Discovery of Osnald in Herdeo City Briefing Purposes Circa 10 Dec 63

On 1 October 1963, the CIA Hexico City Station intercepted a telephone call Lee CSWAID made from an unknown location in Mexico City to the Soviet Embassy there, using his own name. Speaking broken Russian and using his true name, CSWAID was talking to the Embassy guard, CSYMDKOV, who often enswers the phone. CGWAID said he had visited the Exbassy the previous Saturday (23 September 1963) and spoken to a consul whose name he had forgotten, and who had proxised to send a telegram for him to Washington. He wanted to know if there were "anything new." The guard said if the consul was dark it was (Valeriy Vladimirovich) KONTKOV. The guard checked with someone else and said that the massage had gone out but no answer had been received. He then hung up.

This piece of information was produced from a telephone tap center which we operate jointly with the office of the President of Mexico. It is highly secret and not known to Mexican security and law enforcement officials, who have Their own centers By 9 October, the OBWALD telephone conversation of 1 October hal been transcribed and a suspary of it cabled to Washington.

Document Number 367-726 SEURET

for FOIA Review on MAY 1976

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW CONDUCTED ON 25 MAY 1975 E IMPOET CL BY 0/12203

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The cabled report was received in Mashington on 9 October and checked in our files, where it was immediately noted that the Lee OSWALD phoning the Soviet Embassy in Paxico City was probably the Lee OSWAID who had defected to the Soviet Union in 1959 and returned to the USA in 1962. On 10 October 1963, the day after the report from Mexico City, CIA Headquarters sent out a cabled report about Lee CSWAID's phone call to the Soviet Embassy; the report went to the FEI, the Department of State (because OSWAID was a U.S. citizen), and to the Navy Department (because he was a former Marine). The cabled report to these agencies highlighted the liklihood that the Lee CSWAID mentioned was probably the former defector. A copy of this same cable was delivered by hand to the Designation and Naturalization Service, with which we have no cable link. The some day a long cable went out to Mexico City informing our Station of the background of defector Lee OBVAID and asking for more information. Our Station was instructed to pass its information on the phone call to the Mexico City offices of the FBI, the Embassy, the Naval Attache, and the Immigration and Maturalization Service. This was done.

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citizens contacting Soviet bloc embassies in Hexico City. Frequently the information we get is extremely incriminating, and on one or two occasions we have it even been able to apprehend and return to the USA American military personnel who are attempting to defect. In all such cases, our Headquarters deak requests and obtains the special permission of the Deputy Director for Plans to pass the damagatory information on a U.S. citizen to other government agencies. We were not informed of what action the FRI and other agencies may have taken at that time based on our report. Later investigation has confirmed all the details of his trip, where he stayed, and what he did. To avoid crossing lines with the FRI, our Mexico Station undertook no local investigation of its own. As we now know, OSWAID left Mexico on 3 October and was no longer there when our report was put out.

Since this telephone tap operation is a joint one with the Mexican
Exceidency, the Mexicans also had the 1 October intercept on Lee CSWAID, but it
experently slumbered in their files until the assessination took place.

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22 November 1963

As soon as the name of Lee CSWAID was mentioned in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy on 22 Hovember, CIA file checks were begun and the Hexican station was asked by cable for more information on CSWAID. Within a week, twenty-seven cabled reports had been sent to the White House, the State Department, and the FBI.

CIA field stations provided many lists of information during the week

m2 after the assassination. The Mexico City Station researched its telephone

taps very thoroughly and came up with several more conversations probably

involving CSWAID, but not actually mentioning this name; these connected him

also to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City. Several Mexicans were arrested

and questioned about his activities, giving a good picture of what he was really

up to. A host of fabricators, some anonymous, bombarded overseas embassies

with spurious tips on the case, most of which we investigated. All of these were

soon discredited, but they are still coming in.

During this phase of our work, we served primarily in support of the FRI, which was entrusted by the President with the major responsibility for the investigation. The Department of State photographed its entire file on

Consular file on OSWAID which had been publicly given by the Soviet Ambassador to the Secretary of State. On Friday 6 December 1963, Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach invited us to review the FRI's comprehensive report on the case to make sure our sources were not jeopardized and that our information was correctly quoted. We found the report highly interesting and no threat to our security, as long as it was read only by the authorized investigative bodies.

After the first few days, the CIA investigation of the case was handled at Headquarters by a staff usually charged at with investigation and analysis of the most important security cases, and by officers and analysis of our Western Englishere Division.

Reports from Next co

As soon as our Mexico City Station realized that Lee (SWAID was the prime suspect, it began re-screening all the written telephone transcripts in its files a covering the Soviet Embassy for the pertinent period. The actual topes were also reviewed, but many of them had been erased after the normal two weeks wait. Several calls believed to involve OSWAID were discovered as and their

contents called to Makington, where they were disseminated to the White House, the State Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

CHAID's name was not actually mentioned in these additional calls, but similarity of speech and various plain points of content link them to him. These calls are summarized below in chronological order. They cover the period from 27 Saptember 1963 to 3 October 1963, the whole span of CSWAID's visit to Haxico City as later learned from travel records.

27 September - A man phones the Soviet Hilltary Attache and says he needs a visa to go to Odesea. New answering says he should call 15-60-55 and ask for the Consul. Caller asks for the eddress, and it is given to him.

(There is no special reason for linking this call to CSWAID.)

27 September, 4:05 PM - The Cuben Consulate phoned the Soviet Consulate.

311via Duran, Hexican national clark of the Cuben Consulate talked to a Soviet official, paying that a male American citizen was at the Cuban Consulate asking for a transit visa to pass through Cuba on his way to the Soviet Union. She wants to know to whom he talked in the Soviet Consulate and who told him he would have no problem about it. If a Soviet visa is assured, the Cuban Consulate

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can grant him a trensit visa and simply notify Cuben insignation surborities.

The Soviet first asks her to wait, and then she has to explain the whole thing over again to another Soviet official, who takes her telephone number and promines to call her back. Silvia DERAN concludes this call by telling the Soviet she herself has moved and gives her new address for the Soviet Embassy bulletin. He asks her to phone (Sergey Sessmovich) KURHARGEKO (Second Secretary who puts out the Bulletin) to give him the new address and he asks who the Cuben Cultural Attache is. Silvia DURAN gives the Attache's name as Toresa PROENZA and adds her tolephone number.

27 September, 4:25 PM - A Soviet official calls Silvia DURAN back and tells her that the "American" had been to see the Soviet's and shown them a letter from the Soviet Consulate in Washington indicating that he had been waiting for visas for himself and his wife to go to the Soviet Union for a long time, but that no enswer had come from Washington, adding that the wait was sometimes four or five months. The "American" had shown the Soviets a letter showing he was a member of an organization in favor of Cuba and had claimed that the Cubans could not give him a visa without a Russian visa. Silvia DURAN

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rejoins that they have the same problem; the "American" is still at the Consulate; they cannot give him a transit visa unless he is assured of a Soviet visa, even though he just wants to go to Cuba to wait there for his Soviet visa to be granted. He does not know anyone in Cuba. They end the conversation on this note. Silvia DURAN says that she will note this on his "card," and the Soviet concludes by saying, "Besides he is not known." He annues himself for the inconvenience he has caused and Silvia DURAN says it is all right.

Consulate. She says that she has the American with her again. The Soviet answering eaks her to wait. When another Soviet takes up the phone, Silvia puts the American on. The American tries to talk Russian to the Soviet who answers in English. The American asks him to speak Russian. The American says that he had been in the Soviet Embassy and spoken with the Consul, and that they had taken his address. The Soviet replies that he knows that. The American them says, somewhat emigmatically: "I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address because they have it." The Soviet invites him to stop by again and give them the address, and the American agrees to do so.

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(In this conversation, the American was speaking hardly recognizable Russian.)

As far as our records show, OSWAID did not phone the Soviet or Cuben Embassies again until Tuesday, 1 October 1963. The intervening days were a Sunday and a Nonday. The contents of his later calls seem to show he did not contact the Soviets on lim those days.

1 October, 10:31 AM - A man calls the Soviet Military Attache in broken
Rushian and says he had been at their place the previous Saturday (28 September)
and talked to their Consul. They had said they would send a telegram to Washington,
and he wanted to know if there were snything new. The Soviets ask him to call
snother phone number and gives him 15-60-55, saying to ask for a Consul.

1 October, 10:45 AH - (This is the phone call in which CSWAID used his true mose and which was therefore cabled to Washington on 9 October 1963.)

Lee CSWAID called the Soviet Embassy and announced his own name, saying he had visited them the previous Saturday and spoken with a Consul. They had said they would send a telegram to Washington, and he wanted to know if there were snything new. He did not remember the name of the Consul. The Soviet, who was Embassy guard CEYETKOV replied: "KOSTIKOV; he is dark." OSWAID replied: "Yes, my

name is OSWAID." The Soviet excused himself for a minute and them said they hadn't received anything yet. OSWAID asked if they hadn't done anything and the guard replied they had sent a request but that nothing had been received as yet." OSWAID started to say: "And what...", but the Soviet hung up.

3 October 1963 - A man speaking broken Spanish at first and then English phoned the Soviet Military Attache and asked about a visa. The Attache's office referred him to the consulate, giving the number 15-60-55. The caller wrote it down. The attache official phrugged off another question about whether the caller could get a visa, and the conversation ended. (There is no special reason to tie this in with CSWAID, who is now known to have re-entered the U.S. at Loredo the same day.)

Since the operation through which we tap the Soviet Embassy phones in Mexico City is managed jointly with the office of the President of Mexico, the information on Lee OSWALD also came to the attention of President LOPEZ Mateos after 22 November. The next day, 23 November, he called it to the attention of our Chief of Station, who was already working feverishly on the case. Similarly, the Mexicans noticed the involvement of Cuban Consular employee Silvia DURAN, a

Merican national. Our Station suggested that she be arrested and interrogated about OSWAID. The Mexican suthorities had the same idea and she and her husband were arrested on 23 Rovember 1963, in the midst of a party at their home. All the guests were soon released but Silvia and her husband were questioned and released on 25 Rovember 1963.

Silvia's husband, Horacie DERAH Navarre, an industrial designer, said under police interrogation that when OSWAID was named as the assassin of President Kennedy, his wife had recognized the name and recalled she had waited on OSWAID when he came to apply for a Cuben transit visa; he remembered she had said he she dealt with the Soviet Consulate as well to find out whether he had a Soviet visa. Horacio DERAH recalled his wife had said OSWAID became angry and she had to call out the Cuban Consul, Eusebio AZCUE, to quiet him.

Silvia DERAM told the same story. She was a laftist sympathizer with

Cuba and had worked for the Mexican-Cuban Institute of Cultural Relations. She

recalled CSWAID well, described him accurately, related how he had wanted a Cuban

visa but could not get one without the assurance of a Soviet visa, and remembered

his tiff with the Consul. She admitted she had phoned the Soviet Embassy about him.

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The sum total of the statements of Silvia DURAN and her husband was
to sind confirm that OSWALD was in Nazico to get a Cuben visa so he could wait
in Cuba for his Soviet visa. The Soviet Consular file passed s to the State
Dopartment in Mashington by the Soviet Embassy confirms a long exchange between
first, Mrs. Marina OSWALD, and later her husband, and the Soviet Consulate in
Washington about their requests for permission to return to the Soviet Union.
CSWALD was still writing to the Soviets in Mashington about this as late as
9 Nov 1963.

Silvin Mini was agreeted again on 27 Beverber and beld until 29 lovember. She told essentially the same story over main.

Well-placed sources within the Cuban Roberry in Mexico City stated that when filvin DURAS was released from police arrest too first time on 25 November, she was quite placed with horself. The told her collectors the sens story set out above, adding only that the Mexicon police had threatened to extradite her to the United States to confront Lee Marray CHEALD. The resetten within the Cuban Roberry to the news of President Armody's Acath was sendre. To date, there is not are dible information in CIA files which would appear to link Lee OSHALD with the Cuban powerment of the Cuban intelligence service.

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The whole question of whether Les CENTED follows secret commertion

with the Seriets or Cohene in Mexico escape pet de assessed, but curtain

nerts of the evidence indicate to the contrary. Bilvin WEMS and the

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Soviet Consular officials space of his as a was with "so friends in Cobs on the east band, and as a man net "moore" in the Seviet Dahany, on the other. The very spaces of his visits and the phone calls speak against my perret pelo. His trip to Maries was not theelf a secret set; be trypeled with real mass or a close variant of it, lived speaky in Arrican totals, and corresponded with the Seviets through the open mails about it was he get bank to the W. His trip to Maries was apparently make recommany because it was the secret Cobse diplomatic installation where

A perplacing aspect of Chilib's traditioning with the Column and
Coviete in Notice City is his assertion in his call of 26 legionter that he
did not know his address when he was at the Soviet Consulate and came to
the Outest Consulate because they had it. It is hard to explain just what
he meant, but it should be remembered that he was talking in incurian, a
language he could not manage, and that when he came to Maximo be was in the
process of newing from New Columns to Taxas. He may not beyon measuring

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lay hands on it when he was in the Soviet Consulate that day. Perhaps he had earlier given the address to Silvia DURAN and wanted to look it up on her card.

A particularly simister aspect of GSVALD's dealings with the Soviets in Mexico City arises from the likithood that he met with Bowiet Consul Valerly (201-305052)

Vladimirowich KOSTEKOV. In his I October phone call to the Soviet Embassy, the guard CENTEKOV suggests that the Consul CSVALD had talked to was KOSTEKOV if he was dark. CENALD seems to agree with this, but the identification is very casual. In his 9 Hovember letter to the Soviet Consulate in Washington, CENALD gives the name of the man he dealt with as "KOSTEN," but there is no person of that exact name in the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. KOSTEKOV is accredited as a Consular Attache and does actually do a lot of consular work, but he is known, on the basis of his position, associates, work healts and operational intelligence activity, to be a Soviet KEB officer, and there is reason to believe, on the Department charged with sabotage and assassinations.

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Embessy guard Ivan Ivanovich CEYEDKOV is himself believed to be a KEB
man from previous assignments as a bodyguard and surveillant. But unless some
direct evidence of Soviet complicity is discovered, it is most likely that
CEWALD's dealing with KEB men CHYEDKOV and KOSTIKOV was nothing more than a grim
coincidence, a coincidence due in part to the Soviet habit of placing intelligence
men in the Embassies in positions where they receive a large portion of the
visitors and phone calls. All of the five consular officers in the Soviet Embessy
are known or suspected intelligence officers. Although it is not usual for a

Embassy, top secret Soviet intelligence documents which set forth Military

Intelligence doctrine state that very important agents can be met in official

installations using as cover for their presence there some sort of open

business. Thus, while it is unlikely that CSWALD's contacts with the Soviet

Embassy had a more sinister purpose, it cannot be excluded.

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Some insight on the Cuben attitude toward the arrest of Silvia DURAH and the involvement of the Cuben Consulate in the CSWALD case can be gained from two intercepted phone calls made between Cuben President Covaldo DURTICOS and Cuben Ambassador to Mexico Josquin HERMANNEZ Armas on 26 Nov 1963, the day after Silvia DURAH was released from her first arrest. At 09:40 AM that morning, President DURAH was released from her first arrest. At 09:40 AM that morning, President report which the Ambassador from Hawana and asked him several questions about a report which the Ambassador had sent in on the arrest of Silvia DURAH and the Lee CSWALD case. The whole conversation is consistent with the theory that CSWALD nevely wanted a visa. The Ambassador did mention the alternation which CSWALD had with Consul AZCUB, and he says that Maxican police bruised Silvia DURAH's arms a little shaking her to impress her with the importance of their questions. They had taked her if she had been intimate with OSWALD and she had demied it. President DURTINOS twice asked Ambassador

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EMELLIES, shother the Maxicon police had eated Silvin DURAN questions shout "money," and the President apparently wented to know whether the Maxicons thought the Cubens had paid COMID money. HERMERS insistes the Maxicons had not effected Silvin DURAN money, and DURYDOUS gave us trying to put across his point. President DURYDOUS instructed MERCANDES, to keep on questioning Silvin DURAN and to phone him book.

At 7:39 PM that evening Anhanceder MINARCE did call Provident
DOBTICOS back, saying he had questioned "that person" again and she has
nothing new to add. President DORTICOS returns to the issue of whether
"they had threatened her so that she would make a statement that the
"they had threatened her so that she would make a statement that the
"they had threatened her so that she would make a statement that the
"they had threatened her so that she would make a statement that the
"they had threatened her so that she would make a statement that the
"TRIALEZ persists in misunferstanding DORTICOS, ances in the negative,
and anyer "Absolutely mething was given to her." DORTICOS seems to give

We do not know for some what made President DORTIOUS press for inferent time about Cukan maney passed to CERALD, but remore were current in Maxico and symm, we enderstand, in the UEA, thus UEALD had recovered from in circum.

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City with shout \$5,000. Perhaps DORITICOS was trying to learn whether the Mexican police believed that the Cubana had financed CSWAID. In any event, in the Cuban Government sent the Mexicans a stiff note of protest over the surrest and detention of Silvis DURAN, but the Mexicans rejected the note.

At 1445 hours on 22 November, the Yugoslav Ambassador to Mexico, Gustav
VIAHOV telephoned and insisted on speaking to Soviet Ambassador to Mexico BAZAROV.

In a conversation concerning news of President Kennedy's assessination, VIAHOV
soid, "I knew he was wounded even before the Americans." Both then laughed.

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